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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses the Modular Command and Controi(C2)
Evaluation Structure (MCES) to formulate and address opera-
tional air defense command and control issues for the
central European theater. (This evaluation structure
provides a framework and tools to address C2 issues). The
intent is to use the MCES along with the Identification
Friend, Foe, Neutral ( IFFN) testbed to address operational
issues for this C2 system.
The result is a test of the MCES. The MCES approach is
expanded with C2 theory and software design techniques.
This expanded approach provides the means to build an air
defense C2 systems model which can be synthesized to reflect
operational employment of the C2 system. This model becomes
a "descriptive tool" for analysts and C2 system users to
define and. evaluate measures to determine the C2 systems
effectiveness. Representative measures are developed for
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis will focus on developing a method to model
air defense command and control ( C2 ) systems. The purpose of
this model is to provide a descriptive tool which allows
analysts to determine measures for C2 systems effectiveness.
The model will address challenges issued by Michael
Athans in his article "The Expert Team of Experts Approach
to Command and Control ( C2 ) Organizations." [ Ref . 1] Athans
asserts that.
At the present time we do not have ... a systematic,
analytical, quantitative methodology that can be used to
(1) Analyze the interations between a fixed C2 organiza-
tion and a fixed C3 system architecture, and develop
really meaningful and relevant MOE's.
During the 1986 Military Operations Research Society
(MORS) C2 Evaluation Workshop, the Test Director for
Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral ( IFFN) Joint Test Force
(JTF) issued a similar challenge to the working group
participants [Ref. 2]. He asked the group to do the
following:
Develop a tool . . . specific to air defense that allows
IFFN to evaluate the flow of C2 information throughout
the C2 structure and determine if it is useful or not in
winning the war . . . meeting the mission objectives
. . . and operational issues IFFN plans to address.
The test director's statement suggests the model's
usefulness will depend on how well it let's you answer oper-
ational issues. Therefore, the model will be developed
within the Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
(MCES). This evaluation structure provides a framework and
tools to first state the command and control problem in
relation to a specific bounded C2 system. Additional tools
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within the structure provide a means to,(l)define and model
the C2 process, (2) develop measures to evaluate the C2
systems ability to perform the C2 process, and (3) define a
suitable "data generator" to support the measures.
This thesis will enhance the MCES approach with the C2
theory of other writers to produce a C2 systems model
specific to air defense. This model should be able to
completely describe the C2/C3 system ( Athans Terminology)
and allow analysts to formulate measures that address the
issues and problem statement. Moreover, the model will
provide a visual means to communicate the analysts' results




Before jumping into the problem definition and the anal-
ysis we must come to grips with the terms that will be used
to describe the C2 systems and variables of interest within
those systems. The sources for these definitions come from
the MCES document produced in the 1985 C2 Measures workshop
sponsored by MORS. Some additional definitions are provided
by Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) publications and George Orr's
book. Combat Operations C3I : Fundamentals and Interaction .
Other definitions have been created to advance a command and
control theory that will allow analytical study of command
and control systems.
B. COr<lMAND AND CONTROL
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of his mission. Command and Control
functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures which are employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces
and operations in the accomplishment of his mission.
[Ref. 3]
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures,
organizational structure, personnel < equipment,
facilities, and communications which provides
authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data
to plan, direct and control their operations. [ Ref. 4J
A useful way to look at command and control systems is
to break the system down to its component parts. The MCES
document lists three components: "physical entities,"
"structure," and "C2 processes." While these terms are
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accurate they are not a complete list of the component
parts. The additional concept of a separate intelligence
process, advanced by Lawson [ Ref . 5: p. 25], may be needed
to fully define the support to the C2 system. Perhaps other
supporting processes such as a communications process will
also be useful. Intelligence and communications processes
will be considered support processes in relation to the
systems major process of command and control.
Definitions for "structure", "physical entities," "C2
process," "intelligence process," and "communications
process" follow:
1. Physical Entities
Refers to equipment (Computers and peripherals, modems,jammers, antennas, computer local-area networks),
software, facilities, and people. [Ref. 6: p. 2-3]
Structure
Identifies the arrangement and interrelationships of
physical entities, procedures, protocols, concepts of
operation, and information patterns. (This frequently
reflects doctrine and may be scenario dependent). Such
arrangements are often spatial and temporal. [ Ref. 6:
p. 2-3]
3. C2 Process
Reflects "what the system is doing" and the functions
carried out by the C2 system--sensing, assessing,
generating, selecting alternatives, planning and
directing. [Ref. 6: p. 2-3] [Lawson would also include
a processing function which converts sensed data into
information for assessment [Ref. 2]. This thesis will
adopt the concept of an additional process function]
.
4. Intelligence Process ( aka INTELL I GENCE /ANALYS I
S
Function )
The intelligence process is performed by a separate
staff agency which cuts across C2 nodes. Where an intelli-
gence function is provided there is a interactive
15
relationship between the commander's assessment and the
intelligence assessment. The intelligence function can be
seen to amplify the commanders assessment. According to Orr
the intelligence process does the following:
It provides the framework for assigning meaning to
observed activities and situations. It forecasts
changes in the current situation. [ Ref . 7: p. 28]
5. CrosstelK XTEL ) Process (A Subset of Communications
Process!
The XTEL process is a critical function within a
geographically distributed C2 system. The XTEL process
definition is provided below:
That process which provides for sharing of information
throughout C2 system to support strategic and tactical
decisions. The process can also support implementation
of those decisions.
This shared information gives commanders at higher
levels a more complete picture of the current situation.
However, there is a distinct set of rules that governs what
information is shared, who receives what information and how
information differences are resolved. Therefore, this
process will have its own underlying structure. Another
aspect of this XTEL process is that it allows comparison or
fusion of information which may improve the completeness and
accuracy of information held at any particular node.
D. THE FORCE PROCESS
The C2 system's purpose is to direct some force within
the environment. If a C2 node is performing all C2 func-
tions to direct the weapon system, the functions performed
by the weapon system and its munitions will be considered
functions within a separate "force process. " These force
functions can be lumped into macro functions of MANUEVER,
16
ACQUIRE, ENGAGE and MISSILE FLYOUT. ^ (An indepth study of
these functions will be offered in the model synthesis
section. The macro functions will be split into functions
which parallel the C2 process functions. Conditions will be
specified for when these functions become part of the C2
process.
E. BOUNDARY AND MEASURES
The C2 system boundary and measures are mutualy depen-
dent on each other and the application (i.e., acquisition,
operational) for .which the analysis is being done. For
example, in an operational application problem, the process
to be performed might be battle management. Therefore, the
C2 system physical elements that perform and support that C2
process would form the C2 system boundary. Figure 2.
1
illustrates how these measures relate to boundaries. The
MCES document provides the guidelines for measures and
boundaries.
1. Measure of Performance (MOP)
Measures of performance are specified inside the
boundary of the C2 system. [ Ref . B: p. 2-4]
The performance of a C2 process function would be an
example of a measure of performance (MOP).
Measure of Ef fectiveness f MOE )
Measures of effectiveness are specified outside the
boundary of the C2 system. [Ref. 5: p. 2-4]
The effectiveness of the C2 process coupled to some
subset of the force process would form a measure of
effectiveness (MOE) for the C2 system. This could be
measured by looking at some force action or the lack of
^ Lawson includes some time for the force to move
(manuever) in his time analyisis of force employment. This
function will be considered the first function in the force



















AIR OEFEttSE C2 PROCESS
ENVIRONMENT
Figure 2. 1 Measure Relationships
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some force action which the C2 system is directing. For
example, the probability of ENGAGE includes ACQUIRE and
ENGAGE (^missile firing) but not the force function
MISSILE FLYOUT.
3. Measure of Force Effectiveness (MOFE)
Measures of force effectiveness are specified outside
the boundary of the force. [ Ref . 6: p. 2-4]
The effectiveness of the 02 process coupled to the
entire force process would form a measure of force
effectiveness (MOFE). This could be measured by looking
at battle outcome such as target destruction with its
the corresponding effect on the enemy force.
F. DECISIONS
No discussion of a command and control system would be
complete without considering decision making. Decision
making is a complex human activity which is based on percep-
tions of the environment. It involves perceptions of the
present state which are formed through the assessment func-
tion. (Remember, Orr's intelligence/analysis function
provides the framework for assigning meaning (perception) to
observed activities and situations) Decision making also
involves perceptions of future states which a commander
feels he can influence by selecting various alternative
actions. Decision makers may even consider controlling the
perceptions of the enemies decision makers in order to
create an advantage on the battlefield. However, this
discussion will not explore how decisions are made.
Instead, it will define the scope of the decisions made
within the air defense C2 system.
1. Tactical Decisions
This is a working definition to be used within the
context of this thesis. The usage of the word tactical in
reference to decisions is a relative term.
19
Tactical decisions determine immediate responses to
perceived threats in the present state.
In an air defense problem a tactical decision would be
assigning a fighter to a target. It is a reflexive response
using the resources which are available to take care of a
present situation.
2. Strategic Decisions
Again this is a working definition and is a relative
term.
Strategic decisions determine aggregated responses to an
integrated perception of threats m both present and
future states.
In the air defense problem strategic decisions include posi-
tioning for Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS),
committing reserves against a mass raid or even changing
firing doctrine to automatic for a PATRIOT SAM Battallion.
There is an implied requirement to form perceptions of the
capabilities and availability of ones own forces in both
present and future states when planning the aggregate
responses.
These two definitions help to describe how the C2
system operates. If the C2 system operates primarily with
tactical decisions, it is simply reacting to the enemy. It
becomes predictable and can be controlled by the enemy.
However, if the C2 system provides decision makers the means
to make strategic decisions, the enemy's tactics can be
countered. His goals can be denied as the decision maker
can adjust his forces to meet both present and anticipated
future situations.
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III. THE AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM
A. THE MISSION
Protection of friendly forces and territories from an
air attack is the primary mission for air defense forces.
The elements within this mission include an enemy air
threat, its mission goals and an air defense force that must
deny the enemy its goals. The enemy will attack various
elements within our force structure or its supporting
elements. Targets include our ground forces, airfields,
supply depots, lines of communication or transportation,
command centers and surveillance capabilities.
B. C2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO MISSION
The air defense command and control system, therefore,
must help decision makers identify air threats and direct
sufficient forces to meet them. All this must be done
within an environment filled with friendly, enemy and
neutral aircraft. The enemy will try to conceal his iden-
tity. Friendly aircraft ( those which are attacking the
enemy's forces) must conceal their identity from the enemy
while somehow revealing it to friendly air defenses.
Additionally, the enemy may attempt also to disguise their
goals with feints or try to saturate the air defense system
beyond its capacity. Therefore, the command and control
system must be able to determine the size of the enemy force
and mobilize sufficient forces to counter it.
C. THE AIR DEFENSE C2 PROBLEM
With this mission background we can formulate a general
problem statement that addresses the effectiveness of the
air defense C2 system:
How effective is the air defense C2 system in the
central region in Europe in providing decision makers
21
the means to assess and employ air defense assets to
meet overall mission objectives* [ Ref . 2]
To fully attack this problem we must consider potential
physical and structural changes to the C2 system, which may
be caused by external forces or internal decisions. For
example, a physical change could occur when the enemy takes
out the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), thereby
removing that physical entity. Structural changes could be
made by decision makers when they delegate more authority
downward or change tactics in response to increased traffic
volume. Therefore, we can more fully study the C2 system by
focusing our study in the following way.
1. Structure
Focus on the effectiveness of the C2 process when the C2
structure ( and its attendant changes in tactics and
procedures) is varied. [Ref. 2]
Physical Entities
Focus on the effectiveness of the C2 process when
physical entities are added or lost.
This more detailed problem statement leads us to the
following evaluation approach (See Figure 3.1), for which
data can be generated by the Identification Friend, Foe,
Neutral ( IFFN) Joint Test Force (JTF).
3. Testbed Requirements and Test Approach
a. C2 System
Simulate with men and equipment the existing command and




















I PHYSICRL ENTITIES f
Figure 3. 1 Evaluation Approach
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b. Weapon Systems
Simulate the weapon systems the C2 system controls with
men and equipment. ( IFFN is limited to beyond visual
range ( BVR) weapons, F-15 fighter, HAWK and PATRIOT
SAMS)
Scenario
Present a realistic ( Friend, Foe, Neutral) scenario to
test the C2 systems response. (Response is the C2
system's measured capability to control weapon systems
in environment to kill the enemy and protect friends).
d. Modifications to Structure
Vary structure by using existing operational concepts,
e. Removal or Addition of Physical Entities
Remove or add physical entities which will be available
in 1989.
D. INTERIM SUMMARY
As an interim summary let's quickly recap what we have
covered so far. We have presented a mission statement and
related that statement to an operational, central European
environment. A problem statement, which addresses the
effectiveness of the air defense C2 system in terms of
controlling forces to perform that mission has been formed.
Finally, the problem focused on the effectiveness of the C2
system process when the "structure" was varied or the "phys-
ical entities" were added or lost. What remains to be done
is to determine the user's operational perspective, which
identifies the issues that effectiveness measures must
address.
24
E. THE OPERATIONAL ISSUES
There are two ways to determine the users operational
perspective. The C2 systems' capability to support either
tactical decisions or strategic decisions may be addressed.
From a tactical perspective, the issues would center around
performing part or all of the C2 process given a target and
given a resource to project against it. The focus of the
issue would be oh immediate (present state) tactical capa-
bility without regard to priorities, resource constraints,
or the enemy's overall goals.
Strategic issues would consider the enemy' s overall
goals, and the resources available in the present and future
states to deny him his goals. Tradeoffs would be made such
as which points to defend and how many resources to commit.
Table 1 presents a list of issues, which address the C2
systems ability to support a commander's strategic decisions
involving the structure of the C2 system.
Now we can begin to see interrelationships between
tactical issues and strategic issues. Tactical issues
address capabilities under a given situation with a static
C2 system. Strategic issues address the C2 system's aid in
helping decision makers to form a perception of the present
or future environment and meet that situation with appro-
priate resources and the appropriate tactical structure to
employ them.
In the next section we will build an air defense C2
system model by introducing processes and putting them
together. We will start with a modified MCES C2 process
model and work towards a more specific air defense C2
process model. A significant number of C2 process models
are reviewed in Appendix 1 of this thesis, which provides
the basis for revising the MCES model. The C2 theory behind
these models and a thorough study of the current central
European air defense system forms the foundation for the Air
Defense C2 systems model.
25
TABLE 1
AIR DEFENSE ISSUES ("STRUCTURE")
CAN THE OVERRLL COMMflNDER MniHTfllN STRRTEGIC DIRECTION
OVER FORCES TO RCCOMPLISH MISSIOM GORLS UJHILE DELEGRTIHG
COWTROL TO LOmER LEVELS IM THE C2 STRUCTURE?
R. UIILL THE C2 SVSTEM RLLOOJ THE COMMRMDER TO
ORCHESTRHTE THESE CHHMGES IM TEMPO lUITH THE
BATTLE RS THE SITURTIOM CHRMGES?
B. DO RPPROPRIRTE FEED8RCK MECHRHISMS EXIST TO
RLLOU) THE COMMRMDER TO MOMITOR THE SITURTIOM
RMD EFFECTS OF LOWER LEVEL RCTIVITIES?
C. HOUl DOES THE COMMRMDER IMPLEMENT THESE CHRHGES?
1) RRE CHRMGES REROILV UNDERSTOOD BV RLL
COMCERWED COMMRMDERS HMD UJEHPOM SYSTEMS
OPERHTORS?
2) UIHRT IMFORMRTION ABOUT THE ENEMV HMD
FRIEMDLY FORCES IS NEEDED TO MRSCE THESE
DECISIONS?
3) KOOJ DOES THE C2 SVSTEM PROVIDE THIS
INFORMATION?
4) RRE CORRECT PERCEPTIONS FORMED EflSILV?
II CRN PRIORITIES FROM OUTSIDE THE RIR DEFENSE C2 SVSTEM
BE READILY TRHNSLRTED INTO AIR DEFENSE PRIORITIES?
26
IV. THE AIR DEFENSE C2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we will develop a complete C2 system
model which performs the battle management functions neces-
sary to control air defense forces in central Europe. The
C2 system bounds are defined by geographic areas of respon-
sibility within the NATO 4ATAF sector and the physical
elements (command centers and information sources), which
are needed to perform or support the C2 process. The
command centers that perform these functions are listed
below:
SOC-Sector Operations Center
CRC-Control and Reporting Center
CRP-Control and Reporting Post
BDG FDC-Brigade Fire Direction Center
BN FDC-Battallion Fire Direction Center
Information sources considered to be within the C2
system are:
NAEW-Nato Airborne Early Warning system
SIS-Special Information System( Intelligence)
Other Information Scources (i.e.. Flight Plans)
Weapon systems also perform command and control func-
tions under certain operational concepts. Therefore, the
boundary of the C2 system will move to include the weapon
systems when they perform C2 functions. The air defense
weapon systems, which will be considered in this thesis are
the F-15 Eagle (all weather fighter), the HAWK and PATRIOT
SAMs. Figure 4. 1 illustrates the physical elements for the
air defense C2 system. [ Ref . 8]
A. OUTLINE FOR BUILDING THE MODEL
The C2 system model will be built from the bottom up
using the real world architecture as represented by the
27
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physical assets and structure available in central Europe.
This C2 system is programmed to be operational in the 1989
Timeframe. ^ The following approach will be used to develop
the C2 system model:
1. The C2 Process
Modify MCES C2 Process model to include Lawson's
PROCESS function (Reasons for modifications will be
offered in section B)
List modified MCES C2 process function definitions.
Identify and define air defense C2 functions which form
an execution level C2 process for air defense.
( Execution level" C2 process functions directly
control weapons. This C2 process must be disassociated
with any particular C2 node until you specify an
operational concept which aligns the process to a
command node or combination of command nodes and weapon
systems)
.
Map air defense C2 process to MCES C2 process.
2. Other Processes and Interfaces
Define and interface XTEL process with C2 process.
Define and interface intelligence process with XTEL
process and C2 process.
3. The Higher Echelon C2 Process
Nest higher echelon C2 process with execution level C2
process.
Define functionality of higher echelon C2 process.
Show interaction with higher echelons outside air
defense C2 boundary.
B. THE MCES C2 PROCESS MODEL
This thesis will use the MCES C2 process model as a
starting point to build the C2 systems model. However, one
modification to the model will be made. ^ The SENSE function
will be split into separate SENSE and PROCESS functions. ^
^IFFN JTF is building a testbed to conform to this base-
line.
^This particular model represents a group effort by
workshop members at the Jan 1985 C2 Measures Workshop spon-
sored by MORS at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
CA.
''Lawson contends the PROCESS function should be repre-
sented independent from the SENSE function. (Deliberations
from 1986 MCES workshop sponsored by MORS at Naval
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The definitions for SENSE AND PROCESS will be altered to
accomodate this modification. The ASSESS and GENERATE func-
tion definitions will also be changed to accomodate ideas
that were presented in the decision making discussion in
section 2. The modified model is represented in Figure 4.
2
Definitions for each function follows •
1. SENSE
That function which collects data necessary to describe
and forecast the environment. [ Ref . 6: p. 5-5]
2. PROCESS
That function that transforms data into information
about:
The enemy forces' disposition and actions. [Ref. 5:
p. 5-5]
The friendly forces' disposition. [Ref. 5: p. 5-5]
Those aspects of the environment that are common to
both forces, e. g. , weather, terrain, and neutrals.
[Ref. 6: p. 5-51
3. ASSESS
That function which assigns meaning (perception) to
processed "information about the intentions and
capabilities of enemy forces and about the capabilities
of friendly forces"^ to counter the enemy's intentions.
Present and future state perceptions can be formed by
decision makers within the ASSESS function.
Postgraduate School) [Ref. 2]
^The portion of definition which appears in quotes was
taken verbatim from the original MCES definition for the
ASSESS function. [Ref. 6: p. 5-5] The rest of thedefinition reflects decision making ideas, which were
presented in section 2.
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MODIFIED MCES C2 PROCESS MODEL
Figure 4.2 Modified MCES C2 Process Model
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4. GENERATE
"That function which develops alternative courses of
action to ^ ^ achieve mission goals. There is a possible
recursive relationship between GENERATE and ASSESS as
the impact of different alternatives can change
projected perceptions of the environment.
5. SELECT
That function which selects a preferred alternative from
the available options. [ Ref , 6: p. 5-5] How this is
done will differ from one decision maker to another.
PLAN
That function which develops implementation details
necessary to execute the selected course of action.
[Ref. 6: p. 5-6]
DIRECT
That function which distributes decisions to the forces
charged with execution of the decision. [Ref. 6: p.
5-6]
C. THE AIR DEFENSE C2 PROCESS MODEL
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an air defense
02 systems model. Therefore, specific air defense funtions
will be used to build the model. A typical air defense
profile (as defined by IFFN)"^ will be used to identify
^That portion of definition in quotes is taken verbatim
from MCES definition for GENERATE function. [Ref. 6: p.
5-5] Mission goals replaces a reference to desired state m
the original definition.
"^This profile is a timeline sequence for a typical airdefense interceptor from takeoff to missile impact. Itincludes some ALERT phase where an interceptor is scrambled
and force process functions ACQUIRE, ENGAGE and MISSILE
FLYOUT.
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functions that provide command and control for air defense





- *TRACK CORRELATION (Correlate Track)
- IDENTIFY
- * IDENTIFICATION CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Resolve ID
Conflict)
- THREAT ASSESSMENT (Assess Threat)
- WEAPONS ASSIGNMENT (Assign Weapon)
- WEAPONS ALLOCATION (Allocate Weapon)
- CONTROL( F IGHTERS
)




Several functions (identified by an *) will be deleted
from the initial C2 process model and included within other
processes. The reasoning for this will become clear as we
build interfaces between the different processes. The TRACK
CORRELATION and IDENTIFICATION CONFLICT RESOLUTION functions
will initially be excluded from the C2 process. These func-
tions will first be introduced as part of the XTEL process.
They are only present when the capability to XTEL informa-
tion exists. However, when they are present, the functions
are part of both XTEL and C2 processes.
The ALERT function is the result of some C2 decision
(i.e. /issue scramble order) and actions by the fighter
(i.e. /takeoff, climb). This will not be considered a C2
process function. The ACQUIRE, ENGAGE and MISSILE FLYOUT
functions are performed by the force that is changing the
environment. These functions form the force process. Thus,
the air defense C2 process can be described by functions
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beginning with DETECT and ending with WEAPONS CONTROL and
MONITORING. This particular C2 process will form the execu-
tion level C2 process for control of both SAMs and fighters.
Definitions for these functions were developed in the
January 1986 MCES workshop. The air defense C2 process
model is illustrated in Figure 4.3 These definitions are
provided below:
1. DETECT
This is the function in which searches are carried out
until the presense of objects in the area under
surveillance is established. [ Ref . 2]
2. TRACK
Establish and maintain continous contact( including
lock-on for some systems) with detected object;
establish location and direction of object; assign track
number to each track for common reference. [Ref. 2]
3. IDENTIFY
Classify track as friend, foe or neutral with varying
degrees of confidence. [Ref. 2]
THREAT ASSESSMENT
Evaluation of threats and selection of targets in
accordance with higher echelon priorities. [Ref. 2]
WEAPONS ASSIGNMENT
Consider best option (SAM or Fighter Aircraft) given



















QJERPONS CONTROL RND MONITOR {LUC/M) FOR SRMS
flIR DEFENSE C2 PROCESS
Figure 4. 3 Air Defense C2 Process Model
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THE PLAN FUNCTION DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO A REAL
TIME ACTIVITY DURING THE EXECUTION PHASE. HOUJEVER,
NON REAL TIME PLANS ARE IN EFFECT SUCH AS RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT(ROE].
Figure 4. 4 Mapping between Processes
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6. WEAPONS ALLOCATION
Consider options (within the selected weapon system) and
pair specific weapons with targets and assign specific
intercept controllers. [ Ref . 2J
CONTROL
Direct fighter interceptor and provide information to
fighter for target acquisition. [Ref. 2]
8. WEAPONS CONTROL and MONITORING
Monitor expenditure of weapons (SAMs) and inhibit
engagements to preserve resources or protect friendly
aircraft. [Ref. 2]
D. MODIFIED MCES C2 PROCESS VS. AIR DEFENSE C2 PROCESS
The final step in our development of the air defense C2
process is to compare it to the modified MCES C2 process for
completeness. A mapping between these processes is
presented in Figure 4. 4 A listing for this mapping between
processes is presented below:
SENSE corresponds to DETECT
- PROCESS corresponds to TRACK and IDENTIFY
- ASSESS Corresponds to THREAT ASSESSMENT
- GENERATE/SELECT corresponds to WEAPONS ASSIGNMENT^
- GENERATE/SELECT corresponds to WEAPONS ALLOCATION^
PLAN does not correspond to any function in real
time. ' "
^The GENERATE function is minimal as there are only two
alternative choices (SAMs or fighters).
''Alternatives must be timely to meet intercept opportu-
nities. Operators will tend to simplify this GENERATE func-
tion to meet time constraints.
^°This PLAN function does not correspond in this execu-
tion level C2 process. The plan has been injected through
desired state by higher echelons and is a non real time
plan. Rules of Engagement (ROE) would be an example of a
non real time" plan.
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- DIRECT Corresponds to CONTROL for fighters and WEAPONS
CONTROL and MONITOR for SAMs.
The C2 process just described is an execution level C2
process which directly controls weapon systems. It is not
associated with any command node or weapon system at this
point.
E. XTEL PROCESS DEFINITION AND INTERFACE
The previous section described an execution level C2
process for air defense. This is a C2 process which affects
direct control over air defense weapon systems. A node which
is performing this process can operate independently by
generating its own targets and using its own forces to
engage them in accordance with higher echelon priorities or
doctrine. However, in the complete C2 system there are many
lateral or vertical command nodes, which have authority to
engage targets. Each node normally has a specific
geographic area or perhaps an altitude regime where they are
responsible for intercepting hostile targets.
At an individual command node targets may enter its area
of responsibility long enough for identification, but exit
before an intercept can be made. Therefore, an individual
node may produce information about targets it cannot use,
which is useful to a C2 node that has a better intercept
opportunity.
With these thoughts in mind, air defense C2 systems
designers have built communications (XTEL) networks to share
target information that is developed by the individual C2
nodes. This sharing of information can reduce the time
needed to process a target since it may already be
processed. Another benefit to this sharing of information
is the ability to fuse information when several nodes have
processed the same target. There is a potential to deter-
mine which node has the best information and use it to clas-
sify the target or at least influence the classification of
the target. Hopefully, accuracy will be improved.
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1. Definitions
The preceding discussion has pointed out the need to
provide for separate XTEL process between nodes to share and
fuse target information. As a starting point this process
must have the following functions at each node which shares
information: ^ ^
a. XTEL Function
Transfer and receipt of information via data link with
some rules or filters, which specify where information
is sent and what information will be received.
TRACK CORRELATION
Resolve location and track numbering disagreements in
the C2 system. [ Ref . 2]
c. ID CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Resolve conflicts that may arise in the identificaton
process between different C2 nodes. [Ref. 2] At some
nodes this is a fusion process. At other nodes it is a
binary decision process.
A conceptual model of this XTEL process is
interfaced with two execution level C2 processes in 4.
5
While a great deal of this process can be automated, manual
intervention is still possible as part of the resolution
process.
F. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND INTERFACE
The definition for the intelligence process was given in
section 2. The definition described a staff agency, which
helps to form the commander's perception of both present and
future states of the environment. The intelligence process
^^The XTEL process could also be viewed as a function.
However, the TRACK CORRELATION and ID CONFLICT RESOLUTION
functions can only be present when you have XTEL capabili-
ties. Therefore these functions are grouped together and






















































LRTERRL OR VERTICAL C2 NODES
XTEL INTERFflCE
Figure 4. 5 XTEL, C2 Process Interface
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can be viewed as a separate staff agency, which disseminates
information to many C2 nodes to accomplish this task. But
this is only one of the many ways this process can be inter-
faced into the C2 system. In this thesis, the intelligence
process will be modeled to show its contribution to battle
management in real time.
1. Definitions
The intelligence process functions will parallel the
definitions provided in the MCES and air defense C2 process
definitions. differences. Intelligence process definitions
are:
a. SENSE
That function which collects data necessary to describe
and forecast the environment. ( Data sources differ from
DETECT function for C2 nodes and the focus is on
collecting data about the enemy).
PROCESS
That function that transforms data into information
about the enemy forces' disposition and actions. (This
implies identification)
c. INTELLIGENCE CORRELATION ( IC)
Correlate intelligence information with track and ID
information.
ASSESS
Examine information and look for patterns that indicate
actions or intentions of enemy. Use patterns to
forecast possible future changes m environment.
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e. DISSEMINATE




This intelligence process can be interfaced with the
C2 process or with both the XTEL process and C2 process.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.
5
a. INTELLIGENCE CORRELATION Interface
The key for making intelligence information
useful to a commander in real time is the INTELLIGENCE
CORRELATION function. This function can form an interface
with both the XTEL process and the C2 process.
b. ASSESS Interface
The intelligence process ASSESS function is
interfaced with the C2 process at the ASSESS THREAT function
as a supporting function. While the intelligence ASSESS
function amplifies perceptions about the enemy, the deci-
sion maker performing the C2 process function, ASSESS
THREAT, considers both enemy and friendly capabilities to
form his perception of the environment. However, there are
some time sync considerations.
The intelligence process may develop information
about the enemy before the enemy comes into radar coverage.
This would mean intelligence process functions, SENSE,
PROCESS, ASSESS would be performed first. This intelligence
assessment could be used to form some future state percep-
tion for the commander's ASSESS THREAT function. That
commander could act to mass his own forces to deal with that
future state. The intelligence officer could subsequently
l^The DISSEMINATE function will be excluded from the
model because its major impact may be felt in non real time.
This thesis will explore the interfaces with an intelligenceprocess to a single commander to explore how the information












































INTELL, C2 PROCESS irSTERFfiCE
IMTELL,XTEL.C2 PROCESS IINTERFRCE
Figure 4. 6 INTEL, XTEL, C2 Process Interface
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confirm his assessment by performing the . INTELLIGENCE
CORRELATION function when the potential targets enter radar
coverage.
G. THE HIGHER ECHELON C2 PROCESS
The functions of the higher echelon C2 process are
difficult to describe in precise terms. Commanders at this
level must consider strategies, which support or coordinate
with ether warfighting missions. Therefore, they will make
tradeoffs on priorities and resources, which consider more
than one mission area. Depending on their overall assess-
ment, they can control action themselves, delegate authority
or provide direction to subordinates. ( Lawson' s analysis of
APL model). [ Ref . 10]
This higher echelon C2 process will be modeled with
respect to command and control elements inside and outside
the air defense C2 system boundary. Interfaces with these
C2 elements are shown Figure 4. 7
The figure illustrates two of the missions which would
be managed at the Sector Operations Center (SOC). A coordi-
nation C2 element makes tradeoffs between close air support
(CAS) and air defense missions. An example of a tradeoff
decision might be imposing a rigid air defense ROE in an
area where CAS operations are taking place. The air defense
element at the SOC would direct the affected CRC to imple-
ment the ROE. That CRC would, in turn, pass the ROE to
weapon systems under its control.
There are several other points illustrated by the
Figure, which should be discussed. The XTEL process is
interfaced laterally with adjacent C2 processes at the CRC
level for the purpose of sharing 'intersection' information
and improving the accuracy of that information. To some
degree the weapon systems will also generate information and
crosstell it to the command centers. The SOC is represented








Figure 4. 7 Higher Echelon C2 Process Interface
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have its own organic sensors and responsibility to fuse
information has been delegated to lower C2 elements.
Finally, the CRC controls launch and recovery for all
aircraft in addition to providing intercept control to air
defense fighters.
The NAEW has been excluded from the Figure, but it would
be interfaced with the XTEL process and share its informa-
tion throughout the C2 system. The intelligence process has
been interfaced at the CRC. The intelligence process it
could have been interfaced at the CRC, CRP, SOC or NAEW.
H. SUMMARY
In this section we have built a complete C2 system to
represent the command and control of the air defense forces.
The C2 process, XTEL process and intelligence process have
been integrated to build this system. However, we have not
discussed the physical entities, which perform these
processes. Nor have we discussed the structure (relation-
ships) between these physical entities. The next section
will relate "physical entities" (man or machine),
"structure" and C2 system processes.
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V. MODEL SYNTHESIS
This section will describe the interrelationship between
"processes," "physical entities" and "structure." With this
purpose in mind, a software design technique, "Data
Flow-Oriented Design, " will be adopted to modify our air
defense model to show these interrelationships. This design
technique will enable analysts to alter the air defense C2
system model to reflect different operational employment
concepts through structural changes. It will also allow
analysts to specify internal processing within C2 process
functions as well as what or who does the processing. Fully
developed, these techniques provide a means to build a "data
generator, " which tracks configuration, develops measures
and data requirements for the IFFN testbed.
A. INTERRELATIONSHIPS
If you knew nothing about the C2 theory that has been
presented in this thesis, terms such as process or physical
entities would seem foreign to you. But you might still
have a good feeling for how command and control works.
Imagine a commander performing some kind of decision func-
tion. He passes his decision to several subordinates. In
turn, these subordinates work out detailed instructions to
implement the decision. Then they communicate these instruc-
tions to forces, which can act in the environment. In our
command and control terms the commander and the subordinates
were performing separate functions within a C2 process. The
subordinates' function is related to the commander's func-
tion by the commander's decision (output) and the subordi-
nates receipt (input). subordinates. In turn, the detailed
instructions from the subordinates to the force coupled the
subordinates function to the force function. This input/
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output relationship forms a structure between separate
process functions, which is required to perforin the mission
at hand.
The next step is easy. When you add the person and/or
machine, which performs the function, you form the same
structure between physical entities. Between people we call
it the organizational structure. [ Ref . 1] Between machines
we sometimes call it a C3 system architecture. [Ref. 1] For
this thesis we will use the MCES definition.
B. DATA FLOW-ORIENTED DESIGN
1. Data Flow Diagram (DFD)
Data flow-oriented design provides a natural metho-
dolgy for describing a command and control system. It
allows us to use data flow diagrams (DFDs) to show the
input/output relationships that exist within the C2 system.
Figure 5. 1 shows a DFD for an air defense C2 process at a
single command node.
2. Transform Analysis
An analysis of this data flow diagram will allow us
to establish a superordinate, subordinate relationship
between the separate transforms within the DFD. By identi-
fying the major transform center and identifying the infor-
mation flow into (afferent branch) and out of (efferent
branch) it, we can subordinate the individual processes to
that transform center. Figure 5. 2 demonstrates how trans-
form analysis can be performed on the DFD to develop a
structure chart.
3. Structure Chart Conventions
Additional structure chart conventions will be
adopted to formalize the modeling approach to be used in
this thesis. These conventions are listed below:
Lines can only enter and exit function boxes at the
tope or bottom.
Functions are superordinate to functions below them and
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Figure 5.2 Single C2 Node Structure Chart
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Output can be information or control information.
Examples of each are discussed in the following two
paragraphs.
The ID officer performing the ID function tells the
decision maker performing an ASSESS function which track is
friend, foe or neutral. This is information which is used
to perform the next function. Symbology for information on
the structure chart is an open arrow.
The decision maker performing the ASSESS function
picks out which foes are the biggest threats and tells the
Weapons Assignment officer which foe to target first. This
is control information. It affects how the weapons assign-
ment officer will perform his function. Symbology for
control information on the structure chart is a solid arrow.
Notice when we talk about a function we can also say
who is performing that function. Therefore, we have related
both the processes and the people to a structure. We could
take it a step further by aligning physical equipment to
these same functions. Equipment consoles could be
conFigured to aid the operator in performing certain func-
tions and allow the output to be addressed to other
consoles. This alignment would also conform to the same
structure. However, the man would be aided in his ability
to process information and communicate it through a machine
structure that parallels an organizational structure.
C. THE NULL PROCESS
Now that we have the basics down let's look at a command
and control node which is fully connected to other command
and control nodes and weapon systems through a XTEL process.
At the same time we will introduce the concept of a null
process with respect to the weapon system being controlled.
Figure 5.3 is a DFD, which shows a command node that is
controlling weapon system A. The command and control node
may receive amplifying imformation through the XTEL process
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Figure 5.3 Null Process with Lateral C2 Node
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Figure 5. 4 Null Process with Vertical C2 Nodes
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systems. However, weapons control functions,
(ASSESS, WEAPONS ASSIGNMENT/ALLOCATION, CONTROL) , are null
processes at lateral C2 nodes with respect to weapon system
A.
This concept of a null process is even more useful when
you consider C2 nodes, which can control the same weapon
system. Figure 5. 4 illustrates a Brigade Fire Direction
Center ( BDG FDC) and a Battallion (BN) FDC. Both C2 nodes
have the potential to control the same SAM firing unit, but
only one can exercise control authority over any given
period of time.
D. WEAPON SYSTEM MODELLING
There is one final problem that we have yet to address.
How do we model the weapon system? The answer will depend
on the connectivity with the rest of the C2 system and/or
the operational concept being used to employ the weapon.
For the first case, let's consider a fighter, which
cannot share data link information. All instructions are
through line of sight voice radio. Additionally the fighter
has no means to identify the target due to equipment limi-
tations on his aircraft. In this case the fighter is acting
solely as the force. He must ACQUIRE and ENGAGE the target.
The minimum set of functions to make up the force function
of ACQUIRE is DETECT, TRACK and TRACK CORRELATE. This
assures that the fighter has correlated the track to a C2
track that has been declared hostile. Figure 5. 5 illus-
trates a C2 node controlling a fighter under the above
circumstances.
In another case, we could design a weapon system, which
can crosstell information to and from the C2 node. The
weapon system also has some limited capability to identify
the target. However, the current operational concept has
vested control authority with the C2 node controlling the
weapon. To some degree the weapon system has become part of
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the C2 system. The ID and track information it produces can
influence the ID made at the C2 node that controls the
weapon. But weapons control is still exercised by the C2
node, not the weapon. However, the weapon systems operator
can normally intervene to prevent engagements of friendly
aircraft if he feels the C2 node has made an error. Figure
5. 5 illustrates a weapon Gvstem, which is operating under
these conditions.
Decision makers also have the perogative to delegate
some of their weapons control functions to the weapon
systems. This allows them to use their manpower to concen-
trate on allocating targets to weapons systems without
having to actually control them. The CONTROL function is
now being performed by the weapon system. For example, an
intercept controller will allocate a hostile target to a
fighter by providing him intial target information (i.e.,
bearing, range, hostile). From that point on, the inter-
ceptor pilot controls himself by choosing his own intercept
course. This relieves the intercept controller from the
responsibilities for computing intercept geometry and
verbally directing the interceptor. Figure 5. 7 illustrates
how the CONTROL function has migrated from the C2 node to
the weapon system. The weapon system should still attempt
to correlate the track with his controller unless time is a
factor.
Other operational concepts are also possible. The
weapon systems could allocate and control themselves. In
this case they would only draw threat information from the
C2 system and determine which hostile targets they could
intercept (See Figure 5.8).
One last operational concept places all C2 authority
down at the weapon system. The weapon system may benefit
from the C2 nodes information if XTEL links are up. However



















Figure 5.5 CRC Controls Fighter without XTEL Connectivity
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C2 SYSTEM BOUNDARY /
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TO UJERPON SYSTEM
Figure 5. 8 Fighter Allocates/Controls with XTEL Connectivity
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THIS OPERftTlOMRL CONCEPT
CnN BE IMPLEMEMTED BY




UJEnPON SYSTEM C2 PROCESS COMPLETE
BUT STILL MftY BENEFIT FROM OUTSIDE
INFORMRTION THROUGH XTEL PROCESS
Figure 5. 9 Complete Fighter C2 Process with XTEL Connectivity
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DEPEND ON THE TECHNOLOGIES
RVfllLRBLE RND THE OPERRTIONRL
CONCEPTS EMPLOYED
Figure 5. 10 Fighter and SAM Autonomous Operations
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system. This operational concept may be employed by direc-
tion of higher C2 authorities or due to disruption in commu-
nications. When all communications are cut off from a
weapon system, that weapon system is operating autonomously
and it constitutes its own C2 system. Figure 5. 9 and 5. 10
illustrates these concepts.
E. FEEDBACK
So far we have considered command and control as a one
way information flow, but intelligent battle management will
require feedback from the force to the C2 system. This
feedback will report battle outcomes, weapons status and
other operational limitations such as fuel status. Within
the C2 system this information can be used for immediate
tactical decisions and longer range strategic decisions.
Figure 5. 11 illustrates the information flow for this feed-
back from the force to the C2 system.
To some degree this information will trigger immediate
tactical responses from the C2 system if circumstances
permit. For example, interceptor A cannot accept target
pairing because he is low on fuel. Interceptor B is avail-
able and has the fuel to make an intercept. This is an
example of a tactical decision being made at a lower level
in the C2 structure by substituting interceptors.
If immediate tactical capabilities do not exist to
handle a situation, the information continues to pass up
through the command structure. As many of these reports may
be passed upward, an integrated picture of the situation can
be constructed. This will allow higher level decision
makers to consider committing more resources, or passing
warning to facilities that may face an imminent air strike.
F. INTERNAL PROCESSING WITHIN THE FUNCTIONS
The last task in our modelling effort is to find some






















Figure 5. 11 Feedback Information Flow
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TABLE 2
ASSESS THREAT MODULE DESCRIPTION
TITLE: nSSESS THREnT (THREFlT RSSESSMENT]
PURPOSE FORM PERCEPTIOM OF SITUflTIOM
AMD DETERMIME UIHICH THREATS













SPECIFIED NUMBER OF THREAT
PROCESS: USE CONSOLE CAPABILITIES AND OR JUDGEMENT TO
DESIGNATE TARGETS FOR ALLOCATION CONSIDERING HIGHER
ECHELON PRIORITIES. (THIS CAN BE A VERV DETAILED EXPLANATION,
UJHICH LISTS THE PRIORITIES AND RULES FOR APPLYING THE PRIORITIES.
CONSOLE CAPABILITIES TO HID PROCESSING AND COMMUNICATE
THE OUTPUT AND FEEDBACK CAN BE SPECIFIED. ALL THIS UIILL HAVE
n BEARING ON HOU) FAST AND HOUl ACCURATE THE FUNCTION CAN
BC ACCOMPLISHED).
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level. For example; what rules are used by the ID officer
use to fuse information to make an identification? If
several sources of information are used, what weight does he
give to each piece of information? It would be impossible
to put this kind of information on the structure chart.
However, our chosen design tool provides for a module
description, which will allow us to describe this internal
processing.
The module description does several things. It allows
one to provide details on internal processing, describe
coupling and the purpose for each function. Table 2 is an
example of a module description for the function THREAT
ASSESSMENT.
G. SUMMARY
This section completes our C2 theory. The relationship
between "processes," "physical entities," and "structure"
have been explained. A specific design tool "Data
Flow-Oriented Design", has been introduced and applied to
the air defense C2 system model. It has allowed us to show
the structure between man and the structure between machines
by describing process input , output , and feedback in hier-
archical relationships. The design tool also provides for a
detailed module description, which allows a detailed
description of internal processing rules.
The concept of a null process eliminates confusion as to
who is performing which function in the C2 process. This is
provides a means to account for the redistribution of C2
functions to different "physical entities" when operational
concepts are changed. The resulting C2 response (time,
accuracy) may change depending on which entity performs the
function.
The next section will use the air defense C2 systems
model to develop measures which determine the effectiveness




The Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral ( IFFN) Joint
Task Force (JTF) has developed numerous measures of effec-
tiveness for evaluating an air defense C2 system. This
thesis will not attempt to reinvent these measures.
Instead, the IFFN measures will be examined for their
completeness by using the C2 system model developed in the
previous section. The model will also be used to develop
new measures where existing measures do not exist.
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES)
A good starting point for developing measures is to look
at the C2 process. Remember the C2 process is a group of
functions, which are required to control the force within
the environment. The functions that make up this process
are DETECT, TRACK, IDENTIFY, ASSESS THREAT, ASSIGN WEAPON,
ALLOCATE WEAPON and CONTROL. If you can measure capabili-
ties to do all the functions, this represents a measure of
your ability to control the force within the environment.
Thus, the ability to perform the entire C2 process is meas-
ured by a set of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the C2
system. These measures will be taken outside the C2 system
boundary.
The effect of the last C2 process function, CONTROL, can
be measured by looking at how that CONTROL function allows
fighters to be vectored into firing positions while passing
target information for weapons acquisition. This can be
verified by doing a mission analysis to find the relation-
ship between the C2 process and the weapon system force
functions. Figure 6. 1 is a time line analysis of a typical




























RCQUIRE TIME WILL VflRV DEPEHDIMG OH RPPROPRIflTE
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Figure 6. 1 Air Defense Profile Timeline Analysis
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line extends to a point where the fighter releases its
missile (ENGAGE force function). ^^ Therefore, the CONTROL
function affects whether a target is acquired and inter-
cepted by the weapon system. The event that signifies that
these functions are complete is the missile firing.
The IFFN JTF has developed 9 "Mission Measures," which
address whether or not a weapon system fires its missile at
a target (friend, foe, neutral) before the target gets
through the airspace, releases its ordnance or the weapon
system itself comes under attack. These measures are listed
below:
The probability that a hostile attack aircraft will be
intercepted before it can release ordnance on target.
[Ref. 8: p. V-2]
The probability that a hostile aircraft of any type
will be intercepted, averaged over all hostile aircraft
types. [Ref. 8: p. V-2]
The distance that a hostile aircraft will be allowed to
traverse through friendly airspace (measured from some
far forward point such as the Fire Support Coordination
Line(FSCL) before it is intercepted. I Ref . 8: p. V-2]
The probability that a friendly interceptor will be
intercepted by a friendly weapons system. [ Ref. 8: p.
The probability that a friendly interceptor will be
intercepted by a hostile aircraft. [Ref. 8: p. V-2]
The probability that a friendly SAM fire unit will be
attacked by a hostile aircraft. [Ref. 8: p. V-2]
The probability that a critical offensive weapon
system, such as a friendly deep penetration aircraft,
will be intercepted by a friendly air defense weapons
system. [Ref. 8: p. V-2]
The probability that any type of friendly aircraft,
other than an interceptor or a deep penetration
aircraft, will be intercepted by a friendly air defense
weapons system. [Ref. 8: p. V-2]
The probability that an aircraft of a neutral/non-
aligned nation will be intercepted by a friendly air
defense weapons system. [Ref. 8: p. V-2]
^
^Measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) would show a
similar relationship between our force and the enemy by
looking at the "battle outcome" at the end of missile
flyout. IFFN cannot model missile flyout with enough
fidelity to draw conclusions for MOFEs.
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C. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE (MOPS)
Inside the C2 boundary individual C2 functions must be
performed to complete the C2 process for any given target.
For a single command node we could consider this a chain of
probability measures as shown in Figure 6. 2 If this chain
remains unbroken these individual MOPs contribute to the
overall MOE with respect to the given target.
1. The ID MOP
The ID function is of particular importance. It is
the dividing line that leads to four basic groups of our
mission MOEs. Two of the four groups are "safe passage"
measures and "fratricide" measures ( see IFFN mission meas-
ures 4,7,8 and 9) for friend or neutral aircraft. The other
two groups are "leakage" measures (see IFFN mission measures
5 and 6) and "mission accomplishment" measures (see IFFN
mission measures 1 and 2) for a given hostile aircraft. The
MOPs within the ID function (see Figure 5.2) directly lead
to one of the four mission MOE groups at the bottom of the
Figure.
2. The ASSESS THREAT MOP
In a tactical sense the idea is to shoot the bad
guys and let the good guys go. This implies a simple first
come first serve basis for the enemy aircraft. But for the
overall warfighting goals some aircraft are more valuable to
eliminate given that you have a finite limit on air defense
assets. This suggests that the ASSESS THREAT function MOP
should have some unknown objective function, which can be
optimized by using available resources (allocated weapons)
to produce "maximum value destruction" on enemy aircraft.
We see this in the operational world as a heuristic when we
specify taking out enemy bombers first and enemy intercep-
tors second. Therefore, this function is where more stra-
tegic decisions are made within the C2 process. (Commanders
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Figure 6. 2 Relationship between MOPs and MOEs
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function. An Intell interface at this function can shed
additional light on enemy objectives to further
differentiate the value of engaging specific enemy
aircraft)
.
D. POSSIBLE INTERACTION MEASURES
So far we have only looked at MOEs and MOPs for a single
command node. However, our C2 system is composed of many
command nodes each with resources and the ability to control
them. From this systems perspective we want to optimize
resource use between C2 nodes to prevent simultaneous
engagements but permit sequential engagements if intercepts
are missed. This leads to a "coordination" MOE for opti-
mizing resources and a "reallocation" MOE to prevent the MOP
chain from breaking on the C2 systems level. The
"coordination" and "reallocation" MOEs are listed below:
The probability that a target is intercepted by more
than one weapon at the same "time.
The probability that a target is reallocated and fired
upon given that it was previously allocated to a weapon
system, which could not make the intercept.
This measure may have good or bad effects. If one
missile is sufficient to destroy the target then the other
missile would be considered wasted. If two separate C2
nodes are allocating the target at the same time this may
indicate a lack of coordination. However, if a target gets
through one layer of the air defense system, the C2 system
should be able to reallocate another weapon against the
target. To define this measure it will be necessary to go
beyond a simple process model and use the C2 system model we
developed and synthesized in sections 4 and 5.
E. C2 SYSTEMS MODEL USED AS A FIRST LEVEL "DATA GENERATOR"
The reallocation MOE will require feedback from the
weapon systems or controllers to let the weapons allocaters
know that an intercept has become impossible due to some
constraint (i.e., tactical positioning, enemy maneuvers,
fuel limit).
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Several events should be defined to support this
measure. (Events will fall into one of three categories.
They are defined by some ouput from a function, an acknowl-
edgement to instructions, or some action The examples for
the "reallocation" MOE will fall into one of these catego-
ries). The following discussion demonstrates how these
events can be derived from the C2 system model.
First, let's conFigure the C2 system model to conform to
a centralized operational concept placing fighters and SAMs
under the control of Control and Reporting Center (CRC).
The SAMs will generally intercept targets in a forward area
and the interceptors will take care of targets in the rear
area. However, this is not a hard and fast rule.
Therefore, targets that are initially given to SAMs should
be reallocated to fighters if they get through. Figure 5.
3
illustrates the C2 system model and geographic representa-
tion of the situation. The following list of events support
the proposed measure:
Events (1),(2),(3) represent allocation of the target
to SAMs through a distributed decision structure in the
CRC, This could be considered one event, ALLOCATION.
Event (4) represents feedback such as target got
through. Event (5) relays the same information to the
central weapons assignment officer.
Events (6) and (7) represent the reallocation of the
target to fighters. Again this may be a distributed
decision structure.
Events (8) and (9) represent acceptance of the
allocation by controller and interceptor.
The preceding events were C2 events. The following
force events (friend and foe) are also required to
accurately define the measure:
Event (10), the target enters SAM engagement zone.
Event (11), the target exits SAM engagement zone.
Event (12), the target enters fighter engagement zone.
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F. C2 SYSTEMS MODEL USE AS A SECOND LEVEL "DATA GENERATOR"
For test purposes it is important to describe in detail
how these events are driven. Let's examine the feedback
event (4) by looking at a hypothetical module description at
the SAM fire unit. See Table 3 for the ENGAGE force func-
tion at a SAM fire unit. The key questions are listed
below:
When does the intercept become impossible?
How to alert higher echelons that the target will get
through?
The answer to the first question could be answered from
the Process section of the module description for the SAM's
ENGAGE function. (The SAM force functions are ACQUIRE and
ENGAGE) This section would describe how to engage the target
by stating launch parameters so that the man-in- the-loop can
determine if necessary conditions for launch are met. ^ **
The second question could be answered by the Process
section and the Coupling section of the ENGAGE module
description. The Process section would describe what action
the weapons operator takes when the intercept becomes impos-
sible. Some possible alternative options are cancel inter-
cept and alert higher echelon. The Coupling section would
describe how the feedback of such action is communicated.
This may require a phone call or perhaps the machine inter-
face allows an alert to pass from console to console, which
calls attention to the missed target. It is important to
understand how this is done, because the response time
through the system will be affected by these man-machine
interactions. This knowledge of the options also let's you
define the events which are required for data generation.
^'^Typically weapon systems can display range parameters
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Let's quickly recap the discussion on measures. The
IFFN mission MOEs were examined with a time line analysis to
show the relationship between the C2 system and the weapon
system. These mission measures conform to our section 2
definition of an MOE. •
A strait forward analysis of the C2 process showed that
an accuracy MOP for the ID function would lead to different
mission MOE groups. Another C2 process function, ASSESS
THREAT, was looked at in terms of its contribution to stra-
tegic decisions within the C2 process. A linear programming
approach was suggested for finding an MOP to quantify the
contribution of the ASSESS THREAT function (MCES WORKSHP).
However, these MOEs and MOPs could be derived from a
single C2 node or by considering the entire C2 system
without any interaction. Therefore, two new measures were
offered which described some of the possible interactions
between the individual C2 nodes within a larger C2 system.
At this point it became necessary to move from a simple
process model view of the .C2 system and use the C2 systems
model developed in sections 4 and 5 to show the interac-
tions. This C2 systems model was used at two levels. The
first level described the interaction between nodes or
weapon systems. The second level (Module Description) let
us look at the internal processing and communications
capabilities (coupling) for individual C2 or force
functions.
In the rest of this section we will use the C2 systems
model to address some representative issues from those given
in section 2 of this thesis. We will freely move from the
first and second levels of the C2 system model to look for
interactions and define the internal processing necessary to
support the functionallity of the C2 system.
76
H. ID INTERACTION EFFECTS THROUGH THE XTEL PROCESS
If you consider the entire C2 system C2 nodes are inter-
connected with voice links to decision makers and by the
XTEL process to share target information. (Voice links will
provide another dimension for measurement as these links can
affect the ID process and weapons control process. However,
they will not be discussed in this thesis). These intercon-
nections will produce effects that alter the MOPs for the C2
functions of any individual node. As an example the XTEL
process is designed to strengthen the identification
performance at individual C2 nodes by sharing information
throughout the C2 system. The key measurement issues are
listed below:
Is indirect ID information more accurate?^
^
Is indirect ID information delivered to the right place
in time to be used?
Is the indirect ID information accepted when it is
better?
Will indirect ID information be rejected if the infor-
mation is not as good as direct information?
Is fused ID information (direct and indirect) more
accurate?
The intercept time available will place a time
constraint on the C2 system to perform the identification
function. Therefore, an individual C2 node will use its own
organic (direct) information when C2 system information
cannot be delivered in time. Thus, the C2 node can be
viewed as operating by itself or interconnected with the C2
system, depending on time constraints for each target.
Figure 6. 4 is a data flow diagram, which illustrates these
concepts.
^
^"Indirect identification refers to the determination
of the identification category of an observed aircraft using
information that is relayed to the user from an indirect
source, such as the C2 network. Note that direct identifi-
cation information gained from a direct source becomes indi-
rect identification information when it is passed through
the C2 network to other users." [ Ref , 8: p. 3]
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Figure 6. 4 ID Interaction through XTEL Process
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1. Direct ID Information Accuracy MOPs (IDA)
The Institute for Defense Analyses ( IDA) has
proposed several measures to address the indirect identifi-
cation issue. This has been done by proposing accuracy
measures for both indirect and direct ID information for the
purpose of comparison. Their MOP for direct ID is listed
below: ^ ^
P( Identification category given true identity) [ Ref . 8:
p. V-17]
This is an MOP for ID using direct ID information,
which has been developed by the C2 node which is currently
being evaluated. This measure is really four measures,
which are generated by contrasting what the target is clas-
sified as (friend/neutral or foe ops category) compared to
what the target really is (friend/neutral or foe). Figure
6. 2 illustrates these four categories.
2. Indirect ID Accuracy MOPs (IDA)
For indirect ID information IDA has proposed the
following accuracy MOP:
P( Passed identifications are correct) [Ref. 8: p. V-19]
This MOP is also four measures. However, this time
the measures address the accuracy of indirect ID information
being received through the XTEL process at the C2 node being
evaluated.
3. Relative Tim.eliness of Indirect ID Information
The second issue concerned the timeliness of the
indirect information. The issue is restated below along
with a measure from IDA Paper P-1765:
Issue: Is indirect information delivered to the right
place in time to be used?
Measure: P( Identification includes amplifying
information) [Ref. 8: p. V-19]
^^All measures specify that assigned ID category for
target entering measurement volume is not "pending",
"unknown" or evaluated unknown" before target exits volume,
allocation acceptance or target destruction by another unit.
[Ref. 8: p. V-19]
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However, this measure only partially addresses the
timeliness issue. If we carefully examine the events that
make up this measure, we find that the measure includes ID
information which is not used. For example, if the ID
information arrives before the target exits the measurement
volume or another unit destroys the aircraft it is counted
in the denominator of a probability measure. If a target
only briefly enters the measurement volume and exits the
usefulness or value of the information is questionable.
On the other hand, if the C2 node had ample opportu-
nity to make an intercept before the target exited the meas-
urement volume, then the information would be considered
useful. Therefore, the problem is to reasonably define
"intercept opportunity. " But this could be difficult to do.
Another way to treat this problem is to limit the
events, which define accuracy and timeliness measures. In
these measures, eliminate targets that enter and exit the
measurement volume and targets that enter the measurement
volume and are destroyed by another unit. So we now define
the accuracy measures to include only those targets that are
classified as hostile and subsequently allocated. This cuts
out two of our four "accuracy" MOPs for the ID function.
But at least we know the information was useful for the C2
node being evaluated.
We can measure ID accuracy for measures which lead
to fratricide or mission accomplishment. We can also
measure whether an indirect ID arrived in time to be used
for a target which was allocated as a hostile. These three
measures are listed below:
P( Hostile Ops Category/Hostile)
P( Hostile OPs Category/Friend or Neutral)
P( Hostile identifications contain indirect ID
information)
The first two measures can be taken for both direct
and indirect ID information. The third measure now gives us
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some idea if the indirect information arrived in time.
However, we still do not know enough about how this informa-
tion is used at the C2 node receiving the indirect informa-
tion. Therefore, we will look at the remaining issues by
proposing a second level look at the C2 system model.
I. ID CONFLICT RESOLUTION ISSUES
The remaining three issues concerned accepting,
rejecting or fusing the indirect ID information. We need to
know much more about the internal workings of the C2 system
model to address these issues. We need to know answers to
questions like:
How is indirect and direct ID information used?
Does the ID officer choose between direct and indirect
information if time does not permit ID conflict resolu-
tion?
Does indirect ID information influence the direct ID
made by the ID officer?
Does a machine choose between direct or indirect ID
based on a quality index, which is piggybacked to the
ID information travelling through the XTEL process?
How often does a man override machine decisions?
Can ID information from multiple sources be sampled and
fused together to produce a single ID?
Answers to these questions would provide the rules
(algorithms), which describe the internal processing of the
ID CONFLICT RESOLUTION ( IDR) XTEL process function. See
table 4 for a module description of the IDR function. The
Process section of the IDR module description would document
these rules. The input and output (Coupling section) to
this same module would describe the input and output to the
C2 system, which is required to support IDR processing. The
XTEL function of the XTEL process would route the output and
accept the input form other IDR processes.
To sum it up, these rules define how ID information is
used. The rules may be complex or simple. But it is
necessary to know what ID information is actually used to
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P( Hostile Ops Cat used/ hostile)
P( Hostile Ops Cat used/friend or neutral)^''
Hopefully, this measure will be greater than direct or
indirect accuracy measures. But this depends on the rules
that choose between or fuse together indirect and direct
information. Figure 6.5 is a partial C2 system model, which
illustrates these points. ^ ^
J. ID INFORMATION VALUE
In the above measures we have -introduced a concept of
"usefulness" for information, which corresponds to a
specific C2 nodes use of ID information. This implies that
information has some value. However, we only defined
"usefulness" for identification of hostile aircraft. A
complete evaluation of the XTEL process, which supports a C2
node, must include a "usefulness" for identification of
friendly aircraft. In order to do this you should first
define "intercept opportunity" with respect to the target
aircraft's position, flight path and the units measurement
volume. ^ ^ Friendly force disposition would be excluded from
the definition of "intercept opportunity."^"
1. "Tactical Value "
These concepts define "tactical value" for the ID
information with respect to the C2 nodes measurement volume.
This "tactical value" only applies to the tactical decision
to attack or not to attack a particular air track by weapons
^ "^There is an underlying assumption that these targets
are subsequently allocated as hostile to weapon systems
under the control of the unit being evaluated.
^^Clear cut IDR rules may not exist for every type of C2
node (i.e. , CRC vs. BDG FDC). The best place to measure
the 'ID used to allocate', is at the WEAPONS ALLOCATE func-
tion.
^
^Definition of "intercept opportunity" would vary for
each unit. No attempt will be made in this thesis to define
"intercept opportunity.
^"This assumes the weapons allocator can use the infor-
mation given enough resources.
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under the control of the specific C2 node. Furthermore,
this value will change as a function of time and target
motion. When the "intercept opportunity" no longer exists
within a specified measurement volume its tactical value
goes to zero with respect to that volume. However, the
information on that track still has some "strategic value"
for another C2 node, which can use the information to
anticipate a tactical "intercept opportunity.
"
2. " Strategic Value"
The word anticipate implies that some future percep-
tion of the environment will be formed. If this anticipa-
tion is viewed on a C2 systems level, then many "intercept
opportunities" may be anticipated. Consequently, some
aggregated response can be formed to take advantage of this
future situation. Variables that affect the "strategic
value" of ID. information are listed below:
Response time to transfer information
Where it is communicated
How well it is perceived
Geographic placement of sensors
Capabilities to receive and display information beyond
detection ranges.
A candidate measure for strategic ID information is given
below:
P( Indirect ID received before direct detection)
This measure should be applied to each measurement
volume down through the weapon system. Probabilities for
these measures should be high for small volume sensors and
low for larger volume sensors. Figure 5. 6 illustrates these
ideas.
3. Alert/Warning Measures
To find out the tactical value of this strategic
information with respect to a specific C2 node compare the
following two measures:
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P( Target allocated, given indirect ID received before
direct detection) ^^
P( Target allocated given indirect ID received after
direct detection) ^^
If the first measure is greater than the second, the
ID information provides some warning which increases chances
for taking advantage of intercept opportunities.
So far in our development of measures we have looked
at the probability of events occurring or not occurring. To'
some degree these measures have focused on timeliness in a
relative sense. For example, the probability that ampli-
fying ID information has been included in the ID for a
target says something about the timeliness of that informa-
tion given that we can show the information was useful
(arrived within some reasonable "intercept opportunity"
window) and accurate. However, there are other factors
which have an effect on these measures.
K. RESOURCES (PEOPLE AND INFORMATION)
The weapons allocator and weapons controller and weapon
system can be considered as resources, which must be avail-
able during an "intercept opportunity. " If they are always
available and perform their functions perfectly, then our
probability measure would be a timeliness measure only. But
we know this is not always the case. Therefore, our prob-
ability measures indicate how well the C2 system allows
decision makers to use resources within some finite time
limit.
1. Resource Use through Structure ( The Weapons Control
Transforml
The resources we will look at are the information
about the environment ( ID information) and the people/
machines, which use the information to control weapon
^^This assumes an "intercept opportunity" exists for the
unit being evaluated.
^^" Intercept opportunity" must exist.
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systems in the environment., We have already looked at the
timeliness of ID information. It was considered timely if
it arrived in time to be used. Moreover, it could only be
used if an "intercept opportunity" still existed when the
information was received. A simple way to look at this
problem is by breaking down the C2 process into two separate
transforms. The first transform produces information. The
second transform uses the information. (See Figure 6.7).
Both transforms are constrained by time and resources. The
following discussion will concentrate on the second
transform.
L. AFFECTS ON RESOURCE USE THROUGH ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES
Decision makers can affect how information is used
through the "structure" of the organization by distributing
functional tasks through that organization. In the second





The following resources are available to use ID informa-




Weapon Systems Operators and Weapon Systems
The C2 functions can be distributed through these "phys-
ical entities" (people and equipment) to provide optimum and
timely control of weapons given the current threat
situation. A hypothetical structure of a C2 organization
performing these functions is illustrated in Figure 6.
8
This particular example is confined to control of aircraft,












Figure 6. 7 The Information and Weapons Control
Transforms
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1. The Weapons Control Transform as ^ Multi-phase Queue
ModeT
This organizational structure can be viewed as a
multi-phase queuing model using information to first ASSESS
the threat, ALLOCATE weapons against the threat and finally
CONTROL weapons to destroy the threat. A senior controller
is performing a ASSESS THREAT function. He prioritizes the
targets that will be allocated first. A single weapons
allocator performs the ALLOCATE WEAPONS function. His queue
is formed by the output from the senior controller. His
output forms the queue for the CONTROL function, which is
handled by 6 parallel weapons controllers. Figure 6.
8
illustrates this multi-phase queuing model.
This queue is limited by the weapons controllers.
They cannot accept allocations for more targets until they
finish controlling aircraft currently allocated against
targets. Even if you add more aircraft, more control cannot
be provided until present intercepts are complete. One way
to alleviate the situation is to change operational control
concepts. This is done by moving the CONTROL function down
to the weapon system operators (pilots). Figure 6.9 illus-
trates how the queuing model would change to accomodate
these concepts. The weapons controllers could aid in the
allocation of weapons against targets. Many more weapons
could be paired against targets.
a. Queue Measures
The key measures of performance for this multi-
phase queue is in the service time ( 1/u) for the allocation
function. In the first model the number of controllers
constrained the number of weapons that could be controlled.
This artificially increased the allocation service time
because controllers could not accept new targets until they
were finished with the old ones. In the second model the
CONTROL function has been passed to the weapon systems oper-





















Figure 6.9 Weapons Control (A Multi -phase Queue Option 2)
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number of weapon systems available. ^^ Therefore, the alloca-
tion service time ( 1/u) is no longer artificially prolonged.
b. Queue Behavior
A few more points should be made about behavior
in the queue. If the allocation time exceeds the remaining
"intercept opportunity" time, then targets will leave the
queue. This is a form of reneging. Because of this
behavior, the queue can be very complex to analyze using
analytic techniques. Most analytic techniques assume a
first-in, first-served (FIFS) queue disipline. Also, these
techniques normally assume a poisson arrival rate (M) and
an exponential service time(M).
Our queue uses a priority system or even emer-
gency (preemptive priority) system for a queue discipline.
Also the arrival rate of ID information ( lambda) and alloca-
tion service time ( 1/u) is unknown. However, these distri-
butions for arrival rate and service times can be observed
from the IFFN testbed. There are good simulation facilities
(separate software programs), which can be used to model the
queue performance using the observed distributions and meas-
ures to drive the system. Finally, this analysis method can
allow for dynamic testing of the C2 system. This can be
done by artificially increasing the arrival rate ( lambda) to
reflect increased traffic volume. This will provide a
response to different traffic conditions through simulation
without using the entire IFFN testbed.
M. TIMELINESS VS. ACCURACY
The preceding discussion has given us a means to measure
the timeliness of the transform that uses the information.
But we cannot consider this timeliness by itself. What kind
of tradeoffs are we making when we move the CONTROL function
^
^Available in this case must include some tactical
position, which can take advantage of the available
intercept opportunity.
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down to the weapon system? Does the weapon system have less
of a chance to acquire a target when it provides its own
control? Will this change decrease a measure such as:
P( Firing a missile given target allocation)
These questions can be addressed with appropriate meas-
ures. One candidate measure has already been offered in the
preceding paragraph. But the real answers to these ques-
tions depend on what information the weapon systems operator
needs to acquire the target. He may need just the informa-
tion provided in the intial target allocation. However, if
the target manuevers and radar contact cannot be established
quickly, more information may be required to update the
pilot. Some additional issues are listed below:
Does the pilot need information only?
Does he need directions (control)?
Given target informaton can he provide his own control?
What is the effect of data linking target information
given the weapon system is allocated against an
appropriate target by a weapons controller?
Will the pilot take the initiative to control his own
intercept?
N. SUMMARY
More measures could be defined but our intention is not
to enumerate all possible measures. Instead, it is our
purpose to show how the model can be used to derive measures
and data events to support those measures. In this section
we have derived measures, which apply to the entire C2
system (MOEs) and have found functional measures within the
C2 system (MOPs) that lead to and support the overall set of
system MOEs. Furthermore, we have looked at the interaction
between C2 elements through a XTEL process, which can alter
the ID MOP at the individual C2 node being measured.
We have also introduced the idea of information value,
either "tactical" or "strategic" value based on present or
anticipated intercept opportunities respectively.
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Timeliness measures were derived with respect to resource
availability and structure in the "weapons control" trans-
form. Finally, a discussion of tradeoffs between timeliness
and CONTROL function quality was offered.
The next section will summarize the thesis. Although
the thesis had a single purpose, to develop a C2 systems
model for IFFN testbed purposes, there is considerable C2
theory and lessons learned about the Modular Command and
Control Evaluation Structure (MCES), which can be of use for
other C2 evaluation applications. Therefore, the summary




The conclusion for this thesis could be written from
several different perspectives. Several tasks were accom-
plished at the same time. First of all, a specific analysis
structure, the Modular Command and Control Evaluation
Structure (MCES), was used to approach an air defense
command and control problem. However, the use of an
existing, operational command and control system ( repre-
sented through IFFN) provided a test for the MCES. So the
products of this thesis are twofold.
The first product is the changes and amplification of
the MCES. The second product is the C2 systems modelling
technique developed for the IFFN testbed. The technique is
offered to IFFN to allow system users and analysts the capa-
bility to address operational issues through developement of
measures and data events to support those measures. The
test for the second product is whether or not the measures
developed through use of the model adequately address the
operational issues. We'll start with the MCES part of the
summary by looking at how the MCES has been applied to the
air defense problem.
B. MCES APPLICATION TO THE AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM.
The MCES focus is to address C2 analysis from the users
or decision makers perspective. Figure 7. 1 illustrates this
overall analysis structure. [ Ref . 6: p. A-18] This
sentiment is captured in a single statement taken from the
MCES.
If MOEs are expected to be useful, they must be accepted












Figure 7. 1 Analysis Structure
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This implies that the decision maker is an integral part
of the analysis process. He must become involved to first
identify the operational issues. But he must continue his
involvement throughout the evaluation process to maintain
that perspective.
For the air defense problem the "application" is
straightforward. It is an operational C2 system with an
existing "structure" and "physical entities. " Operational
issues regarding identification have already been developed.
(The IFFN JTF is in the process of building a testbed to
address those issues). My startingpoint for the analysis
was to thoroughly study this existing system. Then I could
take the system users perspective. ^'^ With this background,
problem statements were formed and additional operational
issues were formulated. (A great deal of interaction
between IFFN personnel and myself was required to form the
problem statement. The problem statement was later refined
by the working group at the January 1986 Workshop sponsored
by MORS).
C. APPLICATION OF THE MCES EVALUATION STRUCTURE
At the workshop the Air Force Tactical Group applied the
MCES evaluation structure to develop an evaluation plan to
address the identified problem. Figure 7.2 illustrates the
MCES evaluation structure that was used.
Initially we met with success. The "Application
Objectives" were set and the C2 system bounding was already
specified in existing IFFN documents. [ Ref . 8] The real
work began with the C2 process. We successfully defined an
air defense C2 process and mapped that process to the MCES
C2 process model. However, the mapping was not perfect.
Some members of the workgroup felt that air defense
^''This was a two week indepth study of the central
European air defense system as represented through IFFN. I
also have background in the air defense mission as a weapon



























Figure 7.2 MCES Evaluation Structure
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functions, TRACK and IDENTIFY, would map better to a new
MCES function called PROCESS. ( Lawsons C2 process model
contains this function). The MCES did not adequately define
the relationships between "physical entities" performing the
C2 process functions to readily determine structure or how
that structure might vary. With these successes and
failures discovered, the working group agreed that the MCES
process model should be enriched although no agreement was
reached as to "how" it should be done. But the need was
identified.
Next the working group took up the developement of meas-
ures. By using the air defense C2 process model we devel-
oped MOPs for individual process functions. Except for the
ASSESS THREAT function they seemed to be a straightforward
chain of conditional probabilities, which lead to C2 process
MOEs. These measures were already known to IFFN.
The ASSESS THREAT function raised the issue of how well
mission priorities could be translated into allocations.
This led to a suggestion for some linear programming objec-
tive function which could change along with priority
changes. This idea was new for IFFN at the MOP level
although their mission MOEs allowed them to differentiate
between interception of enemy bombers versus interception of
all enemy aircraft.
There was some additional discussion of a "micro MOE,"
defined as the ability for the entire interconnected C2
system to perform a set function such as P( TRACK). (This
idea was advanced by Lawson). But the real measurement
issues are how do "micro MOEs" affect the ID at a node which
is controlling aircraft or SAMS to ACQUIRE and ENGAGE the
enemy. Again this was a modelling limitation.
With this background the thesis focuses on building an
enriched air defense C2 systems model, which can readily be
checked against the IFFN testbed configuration. A thorough
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review of C2 theory from other writers and some theory
proposed by this writer is used to alter the MCES C2 process
model and the definitions of the C2 process functions. An
additional intelligence process is proposed to include
George Orr's theory on the intelligence/analysis function.
A XTEL process is proposed to explain interaction between C2
nodes at the PROCESS function level. This XTEL process is
meant to explain the effect of "micro MOE' although this
term has not been adopted within this thesis. The following
section will summarize the changes to the MCES used within
the thesis with the corresponding theory behind the change.
D. THEORY SUMIVLARY
1. Definition Changes and Additions
The MCES definitions are the fiber that holds
together the MCES as an evaluation structure for C2 systems.
Unless you can agree to what the system is, what it does,
its boundaries and how to measure it you cannot have a cohe-
sive evaluation structure. But the definitions must be able
to completely describe the system and provide enough theory
to describe how it functions. The air defense system
studied ( represented through IFFN) confirmed some of the
definitions but pointed out weaknesse.s in others.
Additionally, the definitions for the C2 system were not a
complete set. The following review of definitions is







Measures and Boundaries-Partially accepted
Decision Making Scope( Tactical or Strategic) -Added
MCES 02 Process Functions-Changed
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Justification for changes to definitions and added
definitions are discussed in the following section.
2. Justification for Definitions
a. Intelligence Process
The ideas advanced by Orr in his discussion of
the INTELLIGENCE/ANALYSIS function is not fully represented
in the MCES C2 process functional definitions. Separate
physical entities with their own chain of sensors, special
processing techniques exist to perform this process.
Existing theory by Lawson shows one way to interface this
process with a C2 process.
b. XTEL Process
This could be just a function or considered a
separate process. IFFN's need to deal, with indirect ID
issues, to explain interaction between C2 processes and
examine their existing air defense C2 system forms the theo-
retical basis for this process. One purpose for this
process is to produce the interaction between C2 nodes to
improve probability of TRACK, and ID accuracy. Another
purpose is to simply share information to provide decision
makers a more complete picture of the environment.
c. Tactical Decisions
This definition reflects the more technical
(reflexive) approach to decision making. Tactical decisions
are immediate responses to perceived threats in the present
state.
d. Strategic Decisions
This definition reflects the requirement to form
an integrated perception of the environment ( friend, foe and
neutral) and formulate an aggregate repsonse to deal with
that perception. Orr's INTELLIGENCE/ANALYSIS function
provides the theory for this definition.
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e. Measures and Boundaries
The concept of a relationship between measures
and boundaries is maintained and used within the thesis.
However, the specific examples within the MCES book did not
fit the air defense C2 system. In fact, the examples appear
to be off by at least a factor of one. (Probability of
detection, number of targets nominated are given as examples
of an MOE for the C2 system. They really measure C2 func-
tions which fall inside the C2 system boundary. This




This thesis added Lawson's PROCESS function to
the MCES C2 process model and defined it by splitting the
MCES definitions for SENSE. There is a distinct difference
between data (radar paint) and processed information. IFFN
issues deal with developing processed information (Direct
ID) and exchanging that information (Indirect ID).
g. ASSESS and GENERATE Functions
These definitions are changed to reflect Orr's
INTELLIGENCE/ANALYSIS function and thesis definitions for
"strategic" and "tactical" decisions. These definitions are
restated below:
.y rorces to counter tne enemy
Present and future state perceptions can be formed by
decision makers within the ASSESS function.
GENERATE- "That function which develops alternative
courses of action to achieve mission goals. There is a
possible recursive relationship between GENERATE and
ASSESS as the impact of different alternatives can
change projected perceptions of the environment.
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h. SELECT Function
The SELECT function definition is changed to
delete reference to evaluating each alternative option. We
cannot say we will always evaluate every option. A machine
algorithm might be instructed to do this but the man-in- the-
loop will find shortcuts or rules of thumb, which may not
consider all the options.
In the next section of this conclusion we will
review some of the changes and additions which are needed to
represent the real world air defense C2 system ( as repre-
sented through IFFN). Figure 7.3 represents how the C2
process block of the "MCES Evaluation Structure" has been
expanded. It expands in two directions. The first direc-
tion leads us to an air defense C2 system model and uses a
technique to synthesize the model into a tool for analysts.
These concepts will be reviewed in detal.
E. THE AIR DEFENSE PROCESS MODEL
By combining existing theory (MCES and others) with some
new perspectives, this thesis has advanced requirements for
two additional processes to be added to the C2 processes
block. In fact these processes are given a purpose, their
functions are defined and interfaces between them are
suggested. This now becomes a C2 Systems processes block
where all processes will be modeled and combined to build a
complete C2 systems model. We'll start by tailoring the C2
process to fit the execution level air defense mission.
An air defense execution level C2 process forms the
corner stone for the air defense C2 systems model. Its
functions are identified and checked for their completeness
against the modified MCES C2 process model. Functions
within this process are defined specifically for the air
defense mission.
However the goal is to build a C2 systems model for air
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C2 processes through a XTEL process^ An Intelligence
process is interfaced with the C2 process and Xtel process
to account for the intelligence contribution to the C2
system. This connected C2 system is nested with a higher
echelon C2 process which has responsibility to set air
defense priorities and make tradeoffs between subordinate
execution level C2 processes, which may be competing for the
same limited resources.
F. MODEL SYNTHESIS
Many C2 theorists have expressed a need to show rela-
tionships between the C2 system processes, "physical enti-
ties" and "structure. " The model synthesis section of this
thesis uses a specific technique, "Data Flow-Oriented
Design, " to form these relationships. Data flow Diagrams
(DFDs) are constructed to show information flow through the
C2 process model. In a second step a transform analysis is
performed on the DFD. From this transform analysis you can
subordinate the individual C2 functions to the transform
center. Some information is coming into the transform
center ( afferent branch) and out of the transform center
(efferent branch). This provides superordinate, subordinate
relationship between the process functions. Thus we have
defined a hierarchical "structure" in terms of the
information flow between functions within the C2 process.
The next step is to map those physical entities (man
and/or machine), which perform functions and communicate
output from the functions. This produces a "structure"
between men. (This can be recognized as an organizational
structure)
.
This structure could reside in a single node. Each
command node can potentially perform all C2 functions to
direct force actions in the environment. But under some
operational concepts C2 process functions can be distributed
between command nodes (i.e.. Brigade and Battallion FDCs) or
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between command nodes and weapon systems (i.e. , CRC and
fighter)
.
Therefore the concept of a null process is introduced to
conserve the C2 process functions when they are distributed.
The C2 process funcitons can be divided but they must not be
duplicated. Only one execution level C2 process can direct
a weapon system although its decisions may be influenced by
information coming from other execution level processes.
Influence would come in the form of an indirect ID or
priorities from a higher echelon.
With these techniques we can change the C2 system model
to show relationships between "physical entities," "struc-
ture" and "processes" plus alter the structure to reflect
different operational concepts.
All this gives us a first level model. However, many
operational issues deal with the internal processing within
C2 functions. For instance, some IFFN issues deal with the
ID value of air space control procedures. These rules are
specified externally but used internally within the ID func-
tion to determine ID. These rules when combined with other
sources for ID into some decision loop or algorithm affect
the internal structure of the ID function. Take them away
and the decision loop (internal structure) is changed. So
the module description ( also specified by our design tech-
nique) documents this internal processing and how the
information is input and output from the function.
At this point it is time to take a step back to see what
we have produced. In section 4 we produced an air defense
C2 systems model. In section 5 we used a technique to
synthesize this model. The model can now show relationships
between "processes," "structure "and physical entities" plus
reflect changes to the "structure" caused by different oper-
ational concepts, which may be implemented. The air defense
C2 systems model now becomes a "tool" to fully describe the
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C2 systems operation and it is the effectiveness of those
operations we wish to measure. The final section of this
conclusion will test this "tool" by using it to develop some
representative measures for the air defense C2 system.
G. THE TEST (DEVELOPING MEASURES)
We have come full circle from our initial purpose state-
ments which were taken from Athans and the IFFN test
director. Colonel David Archino. Athans advanced a need
for.
an analytical quantitative methodology ... to analyze
the interactions between a fixed 02 organization and a
fixed C3 system architecture, and develop really
meaningful and relevant MOEs.
Colonel Archino asked for the following:
Develop a tool , . . specific to air defense that allows
IFFN to evaluate the flow of 02 information thoughout
the 02 structure and determine if it is useful or not in
winning the war . . . meeting the mission objectives
. . . and operational issues IFFN plans to address.
We have taken a path through and evaluation structure,
the MOES, by defining the problem, bounding the system and
building a representation of the 02 systems operation
through a 02 systems process model. That model can be
adapted with a specific technique to describe the systems
operation as operational concepts change. So we have a
"tool" to develop measures which assess the effectiveness of
the 02 process in directing forces to meet the air defense
mission.
1. Measures Concept Review
To develop measures we return to the MCES defini-
tions. The most useful concept is the idea of boundaries
and measures. The MOES provides the following guidlines for
measures:
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MOP-Measured/Specified inside the Boundary of the C2
System
- MOE-Measured/Specified Outside the Boundary of the C2
system.
MOFE-Measured/Specified Outside the Boundary of the
Force.
This thesis interpreted boundaries of the C2 system
in terms of the process it performs. This idea was also
advanced for the force boundary. The force boundary is also
bounded by the process it performs. Now the guidlines
advanced in the MCES take on some additional meaning.
Measures of performance are measured inside the
boundary of the C2 system. In the air defense C2 system you
can specify MOPs for each function. The initial functions
in the air defense C2 process such as DETECT, TRACK,
IDENTIFY couple to other functions within the C2 process.
When you move to the C2 functions, ALLOCATE WEAPON and
CONTROL, these functions couple to separate "force process."
These C2 functions can affect the force functions of
MANUEVER, ACQUIRE, ENGAGE and MISSILE FLYOUT. The more
complete the coupling the more we can say about the C2
systems contribution to the force to do its mission. For a
partial coupling you could get measures of effectiveness for
the C2 system. IFFN is looking at a process coupling for
the "C2 process" to the "force process" functions MANUEVER,
ACQUIRE and ENGAGE. These measures of effectiveness are
measured by observation of a force action or lack of force
action. IFFN looks at whether an air track (friend, foe,
neutral) is ENGAGED or not ENGAGED.
This is nearly a complete coupling with the "force
process. " If IFFN could adequately model the "force
process" function MISSILE FLYOUT they would have a complete
coupling of the "C2 process" and "force process, " The
results would be measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) as
represented by the battle outcome.
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2. The C2 System Measured as a Single Node
With this theoretical background we can begin to
derive measures. In the measures section of this thesis we
began with measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the C2
system. ( IFFN does not model MISSILE FLYOUT with enough
fidelity to derive MOFEs). Initially we viewed the C2
system as a single node performing the "C2 process" and
affecting the "force process" through the ALLOCATE WEAPON
and CONTROL functions.
Measures of effectiveness were derived as if the C2
system was a single command node performing the "C2
process. " We looked at a set of probabilities such as
P( Detect/Object) or P( Track/Detect) etc., which would lead
to the probability of performing the mission once CONTROL
was affected with the "force process. " But this view of the
system is a reflexive view. It gives you an idea that as
targets arrive, they will be shot down one at a time. This
reflexive view parallels the idea of a C2 system operating
with only tactical decisions.
3. Single Node Strategic Operations/Intelligence
Interface
In a realistic scenario targets may not arrive one
at a time or at the place of our choosing. The enemy may
try to exploit our defenses by applying its force in mass at
a time and place where our defenses are weak. Commanders
(decision makers) must forecast future situations and manage
our finite force resources in time sync with the enemy.
This concept is advanced by Orr as controlling the power
distribution. [ Ref . 7] Even with our single node view of
the C2 system we must take into account these concepts. The
interface with a separate "intelligence process" working in
concert with the commander can affect a more optimum power
distribution with respect to present or future situations.
Therefore we say that a "C2 process" with these capabilities
will make more strategic decisions. It can form present and
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future perceptions of the environment and meet the enemy
force with superior force (given forces are available to
draw upon). But our single node is now being supported with
intelligence capabilities. The interface between the
"intelligence process" and the "C2 process" is at the ASSESS
and ASSESS THREAT functions respectively.
4. Interactive Measures with Weapon Systems
In the next part of the measures section we looked
at the C2 system in more depth. We specified a "realloca-
tion" MOE which required interaction ( feedback) from a
weapon to the C2 system. Some of the techniques from the
model synthesis section were used to specify a specific
operational configuration. With this configuration estab-
lished the system model was used to determine events which
were needed to support the "reallocation" MOE. Events could
be some output from a C2 function, an acknowledgement or
some action in the environment. The systems model was now
serving as a "data generator" pre-processor for
configuration control of the IFFN testbed.
Feedback from a weapon system to a C2 node is only
one of the possible ways the C2 system can interact. An air
defense C2 system is made up from many command nodes. These
separate command nodes produce information which has some
local "tactical value" and information which may have some
"tactical value" to another C2 node if the information can
be used during an "intercept opportunity" window. IFFN JTF
is addressing "indirect ID" issues, which deal with sharing
this information throughout the C2 system.
5. Interactive Measures between Command Nodes ( C2
Processes )
Our C2 system model, "tool," let's us view the C2
system as a set of C2 processes that interact through the
XTEL process, which is interfaced at the PROCESS function at
individual command nodes. Candidate measures were developed
to deal with the "indirect ID" issues by looking at input
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and output relations between PROCESS functions. Also, a
hypothetical second level look at the internal processing
within the IDR module raised some additional questions,
which can only be answered by examining the actual internal
decision process within the IDR function.
More measures were developed, but they will not be
reviewed in this conclusion. We have looked at enough of
them to make some concluding remarks about the usefulness of
the air defense C2 system model.
H. SUMMARY
The air defense C2 systems model that has been developed
in sections 4 and 5 of this thesis is offered as a "tool"
for IFFN JTF to address their operational issues. It has
potential to describe the air defense C2 systems operation
which may vary from one test design to another. IFFN JTF
personnel will need to first validate this model with actual
operational concepts, then develop a representation of those
operations for each test design. With this representation
they can look for possible measures which address their
issues.
Hopefully, this evaluation methodology will provide IFFN
JTF a cohesive theory and "tools" to address their





This section will address the need for a complete C2
systems model. Several models are reviewed for the purpose
of showing capabilities of our present C2 models. Following
this review, there will be a short discussion of what our
models should be able to do in the future. The final part
of this section will outline the new contributions to C2
modeling, which will be advanced in this thesis.
2. REVIEW
Many C2 theorists have introduced conceptual C2 models,
which attempt to explain how a command and control system
functions. These models were generic models, which serve as
a starting point for building a more complete C2 system
model. Therefore, a review of these models will help to
introduce basic concepts, whicTi must be incorporated within
a more detailed model.
The following models will be referred to with a short
discussion of their contribution to command and control
theory:
Lawson's C2 Process Model, C2 Nested Model,
Coordination of C2 Processes [ Ref . 10]
Lawson's C3I Process Model [Ref. 5: p. 24]
Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) Model by Carol Fox,
Johns Hopkins University [Ref. 10]
- Dr. Tom Rona's Canonical Model [Ref. 10]
George Orr's Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model
[Ref. 7: p. 25]
- Michael Athan' s C2/C3 Interface Model [Ref. 1]
- MCES C2 Process Model [Ref. 6: p. 5-4]
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Figure A. 5 ModelsS
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In general these process models have explained "what the
system is doing"( see definition of C2 process in section 2).
Different authors have used different terms but they more or
less say the same thing. Some models address only the C2
process (Lawson's C2 Process, MCES C2 Process) while others
interface a separate intelligence process to produce
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)
models ( Lawson C3I,0rr C3I).^^
Some writers have shown how the C2 process can be nested
with higher echelon coordinating elements (Lawson). Others
have nested the C2 process model with a higher echelon with
no implied coordination ( APL Model).
The APL Model includes an information exchange between
evaluaters at different levels which is equivalent to a
separate XTEL process that allows sharing of information to
create a common perception of the environment. Lawson's C3I
model show a similar connection from the C2 process to the
intelligence process. This configuration may allow intelli-
gence correlation of track data to pass through a Xtel
process in near real time.
Lawson [ Ref . 10] points out another important conribu-
tion from the APL model. In his evaluation, he described
the model as follows
This model also makes explicit the fact that a commander
may delegate some authority to a subordinate, or may
provide him direction (set a "desired state"), or may
simply bypass him and take direct control of action.
Dr. Tom Rona's model illustrates how feedback from the
effectors (weapon systems) is directed back to the decision
makers. This is a more accurate description of feedback
relationships than those advanced by other models. Many C2
^^The seperate intelligence process partially explains
the C2 systems capability to produce strategic versus
tactical decisions.
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process models send all feedback from the environment back
through the sense function. Rona's model also shows how
decision makers, who operate within his transform func-
tion(XFO), direct the sensors search patterns through the
stimulus selection and control feedback loop.
Finally, Michael Athans provides a simplified model,
which illustrates the need to find the relationship between
the decision makers' organizational structure and the C3
system architecture^^
3. SUMMARY OF MODELLING ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Considered separately each model contributes to a
partial understanding of a complete C2 system. Different




C2 Process and Intelligence Process Interface
C2 Process and Communications Process Interface
Feedback to Decision Makers and Directions to Sensors
through Feedback Loops.
4. NEW MODEL NEEDS
Michael Athans has challenged C2 theorists to combine
the physical C3 system (hardware and communications struc-
ture) together with the C2 organization (structure) to
account for the human element present within C2 systems. He
takes his challenge a step further when he asserts that,
One requires a set of consistent variables and rules
which define how the output of an element becomers the
imput to another, descriptions of serial, parallel, and
feedback relationship. I Ref , 1]
I
^^Athan's C3 system architecture includes hardware,
sensors, communications and the structural relationships
between these elements.
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5. MODELLING EFFORTS WITHIN THESIS
This thesis will attempt to answer that challenge by
modelling what we have defined as the C2 system. In doing so
it will relate the organizational structure ( i. e. commander,
weapons controllers, identification officers) to the C2
process. This means that a specific physical entity
(person) is assigned a function within the process and that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
subordination of functions and the people that perform them.
A software design technique, "Data Flow-Oriented Design"
[ Ref . 9] , will be adopted to develop the C2 system model.
Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) will be developed for the C2
system. A transaction or transform analysis will be
performed on these DFDs to develop the final model. This
final model will conform to conventions prescribed for
structure charts, which provide the following:
Superordinate and subordinate relationships between
functions within a process.
Information output from one function to
another( coupling)
.
Control information output which affects the internal
processing of another function (coupling).^"
Detailed module descriptions will be developed, which
will describe the purpose, coupling and internal processing
for each function on the structure chart.
1. The Null Process
The model will provide a visual means for identi-
fying which C2 node is controlling the force within a
layered C2 system. This will be accomplished by introducing
the concept of null processes at nodes which do not have
authority to execute forces when a specific operational
structure is implemented by a decision maker.
^"^Both types of information can be seen to flow in both
directions. From a superordinate it is considered direc-
tion. From a subordinate flowing back to the superordinate
it is considered feedback.
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2. Model Flexibility
C2 system flexibility as seen through model flexi-
bility will be examined to see if it can accurately describe
functional relationships when different operational concepts
are employed.
6. SUrmARY
This section has introduced both new and old ideas about
how to conceptually model a command and control system.
These ideas are used in section IV to produce a complete air
defense C2 systems model.
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